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P.O. Box 2816
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
PAMELA DIANE BORUP,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
___________________________)

NOS. 44205 & 44206
ADA COUNTY NOS. CR 2014-7993 &
CR 2016-1111
APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pamela Borup asserts the district court abused its discretion by not further
reducing her sentence in her 2014 case and by imposing an excessive sentence in her
2016 case. She contends that the mitigating factors in this case reveal the district
court’s sentencing decisions do not best serve all the goals of sentencing. As such, this
Court should either reduce her sentences as it deems appropriate, or, alternatively,
remand these cases for new sentencing decisions by the district court.
Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
In her 2014 case, Ms. Borup pleaded guilty to felony domestic violence, and the
district court imposed a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, but it
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retained jurisdiction over the case. (Supp. R., pp.55-56.)1 She challenged the length of
the underlying sentence as excessive on direct appeal, but the Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court’s decision. State v. Borup, 2015 WL 3397953 (Ct. App. 2015)
(unpublished). During the period of retained jurisdiction, Ms. Borup participated in a
rider program.

(See Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), pp.56-61.)

She completed all the assigned classes and had no disciplinary issues while in that
program. (PSI, p.57.) As a result, the district court suspended her sentence for a fiveyear period of probation. (R., p.12.)
Several months later, the State filed a motion alleging several violations of the
terms of that probation. (R., pp.18-21.) Pursuant to an agreement with the State, Ms.
Borup agreed to admit several of the alleged violations, including receiving a new
charge for driving on an invalid or suspended driver’s license, being discharged from a
treatment program, not reporting to her probation officer as instructed, and absconding
supervision. (Tr., Vol.1, p.3, Ls.15-17; R., pp.19-21.)2 In exchange, the State agreed to
dismiss the remaining allegations.

(Tr., Vol.1, p.3, Ls.11-17.) While there was no

agreement as to disposition, Ms. Borup requested that she be screened for mental
health court.3 (Tr., Vol.1, p.3, L.24 - p.4, L.4; Tr., Vol.1, p.10, L.8.)

The Supreme Court ordered the record in this case be augmented with the entire
record prepared for Ms. Borup’s direct appeal from the judgment of conviction in the
2014 case. (R., p.2.) Citations to that record will be identified as “Supp.”
2 The transcripts in this case were provided in three independently-bound and paginated
volumes. To avoid confusion, “Vol.1” will refer to the volume containing the transcripts
of the February 17, 2016, admit/deny hearing, and the March 9, 2016, probation
violation hearing. “Vol.2” will refer to the volume containing the transcript of the
March 17, 2016, arraignment hearing, and “Vol.3” will refer to the volume containing the
transcript of the April 20, 2016, sentencing/disposition hearing.
3 The domestic violence evaluation conducted prior to the initial sentencing in the 2014
case included a diagnostic impression that Ms. Borup was suffering from bipolar
1
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Thereafter, Ms. Borup was charged with new offenses (the 2016 case), and that
case was consolidated with the 2014 case. (R., pp.59, 122.) At the initial arraignment
hearing in the 2016 case, Ms. Borup agreed to plead guilty to charges of grand theft and
misdemeanor violation of a no-contact order, and the State agreed to dismiss other
charges.

(Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.17-19; R., pp.104-06.)

The State also agreed to

recommend a unified sentence of seven years, with three years fixed, to be served
concurrently with the sentence in the 2014 case. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.10-13.)
At the joint sentencing/disposition hearing, the district court acknowledged that
“the defendant was doing well on probation or well enough on probation for six or seven
months” before things deteriorated. (Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.3-8.) Defense counsel noted
that Ms. Borup had accepted responsibility for her actions, as well as the consequences
of those actions, as “she is expecting it [her sentences] to be imposed.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.8,
Ls.11-19.) She felt that it may be a good thing, too, because she acknowledged her
situation had gotten beyond her control. (Tr., Vol.3, p.8, Ls.15-17.)
Again, she requested to be screened for mental health court. (Tr., Vol.3, p.9,
Ls.16-17.)

Defense counsel explained the issues, particularly those underlying the

charges in the 2016 case, stemmed from her mental health issues. (Tr., Vol.3, p.8,
Ls.21-22.) Specifically, Ms. Borup had concerns about the dog she and the victim from
the 2014 case both owned, and when she went to address those concerns, the situation
devolved, resulting in the new charges. (Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.5-9.)

disorder, attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, personality disorder not otherwise
specified, and rule-out post-traumatic stress disorder. (Supp. PSI, p.186.)
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Ms. Borup also appeared to request, if mental health court were not an option,
the district court reduce her sentence: “the court to take mercy on her and understand
that there is some mitigation in her case in how she got here.” (Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.1720.) Defense counsel also noted that Ms. Borup was “trying to make the best of the
situation she finds herself in,” and had been working in the laundry at the jail.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.9, Ls.10-15.)
The district court explained, upon its review of the whole record, it was not
inclined to recommend Ms. Borup for mental health court. (Tr., Vol.3, p.10, Ls.23-25.)
As such, it revoked probation and executed the sentence in the 2014 case, though it
reduced the indeterminate term of that sentence by one year. (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.1-8.)
It imposed and executed a concurrent six-year unified sentence, with three years fixed,
in the 2016 case. (Tr., Vol.3, p.11, Ls.9-13.) Ms. Borup filed notices of appeal timely
from the order revoking probation and executing her sentence in the 2014 case and the
judgment of conviction in the 2016 case. (R., pp.61-66, 125-28, 137-38.)
ISSUES
1.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by not further reducing
Ms. Borup’s sentence when it revoked her probation in the 2014 case.

2.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence in the 2016 case.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Further Reducing Ms. Borup’s Sentence
When It Revoked Her Probation In The 2014 Case
The decision to revoke probation is one within the district court’s discretion.
State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). If the district court decides to
resume the execution of the underlying sentence by revoking probation, it also has the
authority to reduce the sentence pursuant to I.C.R. 35. State v. Timbana, 145 Idaho
779, 782 (2008). The decision to not further reduce a previously-pronounced sentence
will be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 27 (Ct. App. 2009). The standard of review and
factors considered in such a decision are the same as those used for the initial
sentencing. Id.
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are: (1) protection of society;
(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau,
124 Idaho 497, 499 (1993). The protection of society is the primary objective the court
should consider. Id. at 500. Therefore, a sentence which protects society and also
accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).

This is because the protection of society is

influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in
sentencing.

Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500; I.C. § 19-2521.

However, the Idaho

Supreme Court has also held that rehabilitation “should usually be the initial
consideration in the imposition of the criminal sanction.” State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236,
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240 (1971), superseded on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103
(2015).
Notably, in the 2014 case, the district court acknowledged that Ms. Borup had
been sufficiently adhering to the terms of her probation for the first several months.
(Tr., Vol.3, p.5, Ls.3-8.) That performance, especially when considered alongside her
successful completion of the rider program, demonstrates that Ms. Borup is capable of
being successful in her rehabilitation efforts. As such, it should have at least merited
consideration for the mental health court program, as that alternative would have
continued to promote rehabilitation, though in a more structured setting than ordinary
probation.
However, Ms. Borup acknowledged that continued probation was likely not an
option given the combination of the 2014 case and the 2016 case, which she also felt
might be a good thing.

(Tr., Vol.3, p.8, Ls.11-19.)

Additionally, she immediately

accepted responsibility for her actions as, for example, she pled guilty at the initial
arraignment hearing in the 2016 case. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.8, Ls.17-19.) That sort of
acceptance of responsibility for her actions and the consequences thereof demonstrates
her continuing rehabilitative potential. See State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App.
2010). As such, the district court should have further reduced her sentence in order to
promote continued rehabilitation in her sentence.
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II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing An Excessive Sentence In The
2016 Case
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record,
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771, 772 (Ct. App.
1982).

Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion in the district court’s

sentencing decision, she must show that, in light of the governing criteria, the sentence
is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294
(1997).
In addition to the mitigating factors discussed in Section I, supra, which
demonstrate a more lenient sentence is appropriate in the 2016 case, the
excessiveness of the sentence is demonstrated by the interplay between the two
sentences: the sentence imposed in the 2016 case nullifies the practical effect of the
reduction of the sentence in the 2014 case. Although Ms. Borup will ultimately complete
the sentence in the 2014 case one year sooner than she originally would have, she will
thereafter still remain in custody or under supervision (as the parole board deems
appropriate) pursuant to the sentence in the 2016 case. As such, the district court
abused its discretion at least by imposing an excessive sentence in the 2016 case.
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CONCLUSION
Ms. Borup respectfully requests that this Court reduce her sentences as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, she requests that these cases be remanded to the district
court for new sentencing determinations.
DATED this 14th day of September, 2016.

___________/s/______________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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